Q: 10
Scenario: SageMaker notebook instances are deployed inside an isolated VPC with interface endpoints, yet unauthorized external users can still access them through the internet. Question- How can the team limit access to the SageMaker notebook instances, ensuring only authorized VPC users can connect?. Options:
Options
Discussion
C. The IAM policy option is what actually blocks presigned notebook access from outside the VPC interface endpoint. Seen this approach recommended in AWS docs, since security groups alone (D) can't stop URL creation elsewhere. Pretty confident that's what they want here, but let me know if you think otherwise.
Yeah, C makes the most sense here.
C imo, D's just network level but C's IAM policy actually blocks presigned URL creation from outside, so more secure.
Why not just use a Glue job over VPN? That way, you only pull the non-sensitive bits right from SQL and make sure nothing confidential ever leaves. D seems risky since the whole DB backup moves first. Anyone see an issue with C's process?
Honestly, this one is all about where presigned URLs get created. If the question asked for just network-level blocks, D could be right. Here though, C nails it, since locking down CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl to VPC endpoints means nobody outside makes a valid URL in the first place. Unless there's another way to create that URL externally, C fits. Agree?
Its C, saw something like this in a practice. The IAM policy with VPC endpoint condition stops outside URL creation, so only users in the VPC can actually access. Not 100 percent but fits the scenario.
Had something like this in a mock and went with D. If you update the security group to only allow VPC CIDRs, it should block incoming traffic from outside sources-so external users can't connect in directly. Not totally sure it's enough if a presigned URL leaks though, open to corrections.
C over D. Security groups (D) just filter traffic but don’t stop someone from creating a presigned URL elsewhere. C’s IAM policy locks down presigned URL generation to VPC endpoints, which is what actually limits access. Pretty sure that’s it but open to other takes.
If users outside can still generate presigned URLs, isn't locking down with just security groups (D) not enough? Security groups can help, but the IAM policy in C actually blocks presigned URL creation unless it's through the VPC endpoint. I think that's the extra step needed to really restrict access, but open to input if I'm missing a scenario here.
Seen similar practice questions and pretty sure the key is restricting presigned URL creation. That's why C makes sense, only lets users in via the VPC endpoint. Let me know if you see it differently.
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