1. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). (2017). NIST Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines
Authentication and Lifecycle Management.
Section 4.3.3
Replay Resistance: "The verifier SHALL implement a mechanism that is resistant to replay attacks... Common mechanisms for replay resistance include nonces
timestamps
or the use of challenges." This directly links the use of nonces (randomly generated tokens) to the prevention of replay attacks.
2. Perrig
A.
Canetti
R.
Tygar
J. D.
& Song
D. (2002). The TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol. RSA CryptoBytes
5(2).
Section 2
Basic TESLA: "To prevent replay attacks
the receiver needs to check that the MAC key... has not been disclosed yet." While discussing a specific protocol
the underlying principle of using time-sensitive or single-use cryptographic material to prevent replays is a foundational concept in network security academic literature. The use of a unique token serves a similar purpose.
3. Kurose
J. F.
& Ross
K. W. (2017). Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach (7th ed.). Pearson.
Chapter 8
Security in Computer Networks: In discussions on authentication protocols (e.g.
Section 8.3)
the text explains the use of a nonce to defend against replay attacks. It states that by having a party send a nonce and requiring it to be returned (often in an encrypted form)
the party can verify the message is fresh and not a replay. This is a standard university-level textbook.