The company wants to deploy an open WLAN for guests with the following requirements:

Guests connect without entering a password (open authentication).

Guests are redirected to a welcome web page and log in (captive portal).

Encryption is provided for devices that support it.

Open WLAN with Captive Portal: An open WLAN means no pre-shared key (PSK) or 802.1X

authentication is required to connect. A captive portal can be used to redirect users to a web page

where they must log in (e.g., with guest credentials). This meets the requirement for guests to

connect without a password and then log in via a web page.

Encryption for Capable Devices: The company wants to provide encryption for devices that support

it, even on an open WLAN. Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) is a WPA3 feature designed for

open networks. OWE provides encryption without requiring a password by negotiating unique

encryption keys for each client using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. OWE in transition mode allows

both OWE-capable devices (which use encryption) and non-OWE devices (which connect without

encryption) to join the same SSID, ensuring compatibility.

Option A, "Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) and WPA3-Personal," is incorrect. WPA3-

Personal requires a pre-shared key (password), which conflicts with the requirement for guests to

connect without entering a password.

Option B, "Captive portal and WPA3-Personal," is incorrect for the same reason. WPA3-Personal

requires a password, which does not meet the open WLAN requirement.

Option C, "WPA3-Personal and MAC-Auth," is incorrect. WPA3-Personal requires a password, and

MAC authentication (MAC-Auth) does not provide the web-based login experience (captive portal)

specified in the requirements.

Option D, "Captive portal and Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) in transition mode," is

correct. An open WLAN with OWE in transition mode allows guests to connect without a password,

provides encryption for OWE-capable devices (e.g., WPA3 devices), and supports non-OWE devices

without encryption. The captive portal ensures that guests are redirected to a welcome web page to

log in, meeting all requirements.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) is a WPA3 feature that provides encryption for open

WLANs without requiring a password. In OWE transition mode, the WLAN supports both OWE-

capable devices (which use encryption) and non-OWE devices (which connect without encryption) on

the same SSID. This is ideal for guest networks where encryption is desired for capable devices, but

compatibility with all devices is required. A captive portal can be configured on an open WLAN to

redirect users to a login page, such as captive-portal guest-login, ensuring a seamless guest

experience." (Page 290, OWE and Captive Portal Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Wireless Security Guide notes:

"OWE in transition mode is recommended for open guest WLANs where encryption is desired for

devices that support it. Combined with a captive portal, this setup allows guests to connect without a

password, get redirected to a login page, and benefit from encryption if their device supports OWE."

(Page 35, Guest Network Security Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, OWE and Captive Portal Section, Page 290.

HPE Aruba Networking Wireless Security Guide, Guest Network Security Section, Page 35.

===========

WPA3-Enterprise is a security protocol introduced to enhance the security of wireless networks,

particularly in enterprise environments. It builds on the foundation of WPA2 but introduces stronger

encryption and key management practices. In WPA3-Enterprise, authentication is typically

performed using 802.1X, and encryption is handled using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

WPA3-Enterprise Encryption: WPA3-Enterprise uses AES with the Galois/Counter Mode Protocol

(GCMP) or Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP), both of which are

AES-based encryption methods. WPA3 does not use TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol), which is

a legacy encryption method used in WPA and early WPA2 deployments and is considered insecure.

Pairwise Master Key (PMK): In WPA3-Enterprise, the PMK is derived during the 802.1X

authentication process (e.g., via EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS). Each client authenticates individually with the

authentication server (e.g., ClearPass), resulting in a unique PMK for each client. This PMK is then

used to derive session keys (Pairwise Transient Keys, PTKs) for encrypting the client’s traffic, ensuring

that each client’s traffic is encrypted with unique keys.

Option A, "Traffic is encrypted with TKIP and keys derived from a PMK shared by all clients on the

WLAN," is incorrect because WPA3 does not use TKIP (it uses AES), and the PMK is not shared among

clients in WPA3-Enterprise; each client has a unique PMK.

Option B, "Traffic is encrypted with TKIP and keys derived from a unique PMK per client," is incorrect

because WPA3 does not use TKIP; it uses AES.

Option C, "Traffic is encrypted with AES and keys derived from a PMK shared by all clients on the

WLAN," is incorrect because, in WPA3-Enterprise, the PMK is unique per client, not shared.

Option D, "Traffic is encrypted with AES and keys derived from a unique PMK per client," is correct.

WPA3-Enterprise uses AES for encryption, and each client derives a unique PMK during 802.1X

authentication, which is used to generate unique session keys for encryption.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"WPA3-Enterprise enhances security by using AES encryption with GCMP or CCMP. In WPA3-

Enterprise mode, each client authenticates via 802.1X, resulting in a unique Pairwise Master Key

(PMK) for each client. The PMK is used to derive session keys (Pairwise Transient Keys, PTKs) that

encrypt the client’s traffic with AES, ensuring that each client’s traffic is protected with unique keys.

WPA3 does not support TKIP, which is a legacy encryption method." (Page 285, WPA3-Enterprise

Security Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Wireless Security Guide notes:

"WPA3-Enterprise requires 802.1X authentication, which generates a unique PMK for each client.

This PMK is used to derive AES-based session keys, providing individualized encryption for each

client’s traffic and eliminating the risks associated with shared keys." (Page 32, WPA3 Security

Features Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, WPA3-Enterprise Security Section, Page 285.

HPE Aruba Networking Wireless Security Guide, WPA3 Security Features Section, Page 32.

===========

A digital chain of custody ensures that evidence (e.g., logs, timestamps) collected from a network can

be reliably used in legal or forensic investigations. It requires maintaining the integrity and

authenticity of data, including accurate timestamps for events. HPE Aruba Networking devices, such

as Instant APs, Mobility Controllers (MCs), and AOS-CX switches, support features to help maintain a

digital chain of custody.

Option C, "Ensure that all network infrastructure devices receive a valid clock using authenticated

NTP," is correct. Accurate and synchronized time across all network devices is critical for maintaining

a digital chain of custody. Timestamps in logs (e.g., authentication events, traffic logs) must be

consistent and verifiable. Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to synchronize device clocks, and

authenticated NTP ensures that the time source is trusted and not tampered with (e.g., using MD5 or

SHA authentication). This practice ensures that logs from different devices can be correlated

accurately during an investigation.

Option A, "Enable packet capturing on Instant AP or Mobility Controller (MC) datapath on an ongoing

basis," is incorrect. While packet capturing on the datapath (user traffic) can provide detailed traffic

data for analysis, enabling it on an ongoing basis is impractical due to storage and performance

constraints. Packet captures are typically used for specific troubleshooting or investigations, not for

maintaining a chain of custody.

Option B, "Ensure that all network infrastructure devices use RADIUS rather than TACACS+ to

authenticate managers," is incorrect. The choice of RADIUS or TACACS+ for manager authentication

does not directly impact the digital chain of custody. Both protocols can log authentication events,

but the protocol used does not ensure the integrity of timestamps or evidence.

Option D, "Enable packet capturing on Instant AP or Mobility Controller (MC) controlpath on an

ongoing basis," is incorrect for similar reasons as Option A. Control path (control plane) packet

captures include management traffic (e.g., between APs and MCs), but enabling them continuously is

not practical and does not directly contribute to maintaining a chain of custody. Accurate timestamps

in logs are more relevant.

The HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide states:

"Maintaining a digital chain of custody requires ensuring the integrity and authenticity of network

logs and events. A critical practice is to ensure that all network infrastructure devices, such as

Mobility Controllers and AOS-CX switches, receive a valid and synchronized clock using authenticated

NTP. Use the command ntp server key to configure authenticated NTP,

ensuring that timestamps in logs are accurate and verifiable for forensic investigations." (Page 85,

Digital Chain of Custody Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:

"Accurate time synchronization is essential for maintaining a digital chain of custody. Configure all

devices to use authenticated NTP to synchronize their clocks with a trusted time source. This ensures

that event logs, such as authentication and traffic logs, have consistent and reliable timestamps,

which can be correlated across devices during an investigation." (Page 380, Time Synchronization

Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide, Digital Chain of Custody Section, Page 85.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Time Synchronization Section, Page 380.

===========

When troubleshooting connectivity issues for a user connecting to an AP managed by a standalone

Mobility Controller (MC) in an AOS-8 architecture, detailed logs and debugs specific to the user’s

client are essential. The MC provides several tools for capturing logs and debugging information,

including packet captures and user-specific debug logs.

Option D, "In the MC UI’s Diagnostics > Logs pages, add a ‘user-debug’ log setting for the client's

MAC address," is correct. The "user-debug" feature in the MC allows administrators to enable

detailed debugging for a specific client by specifying the client’s MAC address. This generates logs

related to the client’s authentication, association, role assignment, and other activities, which are

critical for troubleshooting connectivity issues. The Diagnostics > Logs pages in the MC UI provide a

user-friendly way to configure this setting and view the resulting logs.

Option A, "In the MC CLI, set up a control plane packet capture and filter for the client's IP address,"

is incorrect because control plane packet captures are used to capture management traffic (e.g.,

between the MC and APs or other controllers), not user traffic. Additionally, the client may not yet

have an IP address if connectivity is failing, making an IP-based filter less effective.

Option B, "In the MC CLI, set up a data plane packet capture and filter for the client's MAC address,"

is a valid troubleshooting method but is not the best choice for getting detailed logs. Data plane

packet captures are useful for analyzing user traffic (e.g., to see if packets are being dropped), but

they do not provide the same level of detailed logging as the "user-debug" feature, which includes

authentication and association events.

Option C, "In the MC UI’s Traffic Analytics dashboard, look for the client's IP address," is incorrect

because the Traffic Analytics dashboard is used for monitoring application usage and traffic patterns,

not for detailed troubleshooting of a specific client’s connectivity issues. Additionally, if the client

cannot connect, it may not have an IP address or generate traffic visible in the dashboard.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"To troubleshoot issues for a specific wireless client, you can enable user-specific debugging using

the ‘user-debug’ feature. In the Mobility Controller UI, navigate to Diagnostics > Logs, and add a

‘user-debug’ log setting for the client’s MAC address. This will generate detailed logs for the client,

including authentication, association, and role assignment events, which can be viewed in the Logs

page. For example, to enable user-debug for a client with MAC address 00:11:22:33:44:55, add the

setting ‘user-debug 00:11:22:33:44:55’." (Page 512, Troubleshooting Wireless Clients Section)

Additionally, the guide notes:

"While packet captures (control plane or data plane) can be useful for analyzing traffic, the ‘user-

debug’ feature provides more detailed logs for troubleshooting client-specific issues, such as failed

authentication or association problems." (Page 513, Debugging Tools Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Troubleshooting Wireless Clients Section, Page 512.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Debugging Tools Section, Page 513.

===========

In a WLAN setup that uses 802.1X for authentication, the role assigned to a user is determined by the

result of the authentication process. When a user successfully authenticates via 802.1X, the RADIUS

server may include a Vendor-Specific Attribute (VSA), such as the Aruba-User-Role, in the Access-

Accept message. This attribute specifies the role that should be assigned to the user. If the RADIUS

Access-Accept message includes an Aruba-User-Role VSA set to "employee1", the client should be

assigned the "employee1" role, as per the VSA, and not the default "guest" role. The "guest" role

would typically be a fallback if no other role is specified or if the authentication fails.

Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are both designed to disrupt

the availability of a network, service, or device by overwhelming it with traffic or requests. HPE

Aruba Networking documentation, particularly in the context of Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP)

and network security, often discusses these attacks to help administrators mitigate them.

DoS Attack: A DoS attack is launched from a single source (e.g., one device or IP address) and aims to

overwhelm a target (e.g., a server, network, or device) with traffic, making it unavailable to

legitimate users. For example, a DoS attack might flood a server with SYN packets to exhaust its

resources.

DDoS Attack: A DDoS attack is a more sophisticated version of a DoS attack, where the attack is

launched from multiple sources (e.g., a botnet of compromised devices). These sources work

together to overwhelm the target, making the attack harder to mitigate because the traffic comes

from many different IP addresses.

Option A, "A DDoS attack originates from external devices, while a DoS attack originates from

internal devices," is incorrect. Both DoS and DDoS attacks can originate from external or internal

devices. The distinction is not about the location of the devices but the number of sources involved.

Option B, "A DoS attack targets one server; a DDoS attack targets all the clients that use a server," is

incorrect. Both DoS and DDoS attacks typically target a single entity (e.g., a server, network, or

device) to disrupt its availability. They do not target "all the clients that use a server."

Option C, "A DDoS attack targets multiple devices, while a DoS is designed to incapacitate only one

device," is incorrect. Both DoS and DDoS attacks usually target a single device or service to

overwhelm it. The difference lies in the source of the attack, not the number of targets.

Option D, "A DDoS attack is launched from multiple devices, while a DoS attack is launched from a

single device," is correct. This is the primary distinction between the two: a DDoS attack involves

multiple sources (e.g., a botnet), while a DoS attack originates from a single source.

The HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide states:

"A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is launched from a single device to overwhelm a target, such as a

server or network, making it unavailable to legitimate users. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

attack, in contrast, is launched from multiple devices, often a botnet of compromised systems, to

flood the target with traffic from many sources, making it harder to mitigate." (Page 20, DoS and

DDoS Attacks Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:

"The Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system can detect DoS and DDoS attacks. A DoS attack

originates from a single source, while a DDoS attack involves multiple sources working together to

overwhelm the target, such as a server or network infrastructure." (Page 423, WIP Threat Detection

Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide, DoS and DDoS Attacks Section, Page 20.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, WIP Threat Detection Section, Page 423.

===========

The scenario involves an HPE Aruba Networking Instant AP (IAP) cluster with a WLAN configured for

WPA3-Enterprise security, using HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) as the

authentication server. CPPM is set to require EAP-TLS for authentication. A Windows 10 client

attempts to connect but fails, and the CPPM Access Tracker shows an error: "Client does not support

configured EAP methods," with the error code 9015 under the RADIUS protocol category.

EAP-TLS (Extensible Authentication Protocol - Transport Layer Security) is a certificate-based

authentication method that requires both the client (supplicant) and the server (CPPM) to present

valid certificates during the authentication process. The error message indicates that the client does

not support the EAP method configured on CPPM (EAP-TLS), meaning the client is either not

configured to use EAP-TLS or lacks the necessary components to perform EAP-TLS authentication.

Option B, "Whether the client has a valid certificate installed on it to let it support EAP-TLS," is

correct. EAP-TLS requires the client to have a valid client certificate issued by a trusted Certificate

Authority (CA) that CPPM trusts. If the Windows 10 client does not have a client certificate installed,

or if the certificate is invalid (e.g., expired, not trusted by CPPM, or missing), the client cannot

negotiate EAP-TLS, resulting in the error seen in CPPM. This is a common issue in EAP-TLS

deployments, and checking the client’s certificate is a critical troubleshooting step.

Option A, "Whether EAP-TLS is enabled in the AAA Profile settings for the WLAN on the IAP cluster,"

is incorrect because the error indicates that CPPM received the authentication request and rejected

it due to the client’s inability to support EAP-TLS. This suggests that the IAP cluster is correctly

configured to use EAP-TLS (as the request reached CPPM with EAP-TLS as the method). The AAA

profile on the IAP cluster is likely already set to use EAP-TLS, or the error would be different (e.g., a

connectivity or configuration mismatch issue).

Option C, "Whether EAP-TLS is enabled in the SSID Profile settings for the WLAN on the IAP cluster,"

is incorrect for a similar reason. The SSID profile on the IAP cluster defines the security settings (e.g.,

WPA3-Enterprise), and the AAA profile specifies the EAP method. Since the authentication request

reached CPPM with EAP-TLS, the IAP cluster is correctly configured to use EAP-TLS.

Option D, "Whether the client has a third-party 802.1X supplicant, as Windows 10 does not support

EAP-TLS," is incorrect because Windows 10 natively supports EAP-TLS. The built-in Windows 10

802.1X supplicant (Windows WLAN AutoConfig service) supports EAP-TLS, provided a valid client

certificate is installed. A third-party supplicant is not required.

The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:

"EAP-TLS requires both the client and the server to present a valid certificate during the

authentication process. If the client does not have a valid certificate installed, or if the certificate is

not trusted by ClearPass (e.g., the issuing CA is not in the ClearPass trust list), the authentication will

fail with an error such as ‘Client does not support configured EAP methods’ (Error Code 9015). To

resolve this, ensure that the client has a valid certificate installed and that the certificate’s issuing CA

is trusted by ClearPass." (Page 295, EAP-TLS Troubleshooting Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Instant 8.11 User Guide notes:

"For WPA3-Enterprise with EAP-TLS, the client must have a valid client certificate installed to

authenticate successfully. If the client lacks a certificate or the certificate is invalid, the

authentication will fail, and ClearPass will log an error indicating that the client does not support the

configured EAP method." (Page 189, WPA3-Enterprise Configuration Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide, EAP-TLS Troubleshooting Section,

Page 295.

HPE Aruba Networking Instant 8.11 User Guide, WPA3-Enterprise Configuration Section, Page 189.

===========

When a client (e.g., a Chrome browser) accesses an HTTPS server, the server presents a certificate to

establish a secure connection. The client must validate the certificate to trust the server. The

certificate in this scenario has the following properties:

Subject name: myhost.example.com

SAN (Subject Alternative Name): DNS: myhost.example.com; DNS: myhost1.example.com

Extended Key Usage (EKU): Server authentication

Issuer: MyCA_Signing (an intermediate CA)

The server also sends an intermediate CA certificate for MyCA_Signing, signed by MyCA (the root

CA).

The client’s Trusted CA Certificate list does not include MyCA or MyCA_Signing.

Certificate Validation Process:

Name Validation: The client checks if the server’s hostname (myhost1.example.com) matches the

Subject name or a SAN in the certificate. Here, the SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," so the

name validation passes.

EKU Validation: The client verifies that the certificate’s EKU includes "Server authentication," which is

required for HTTPS. The EKU is correctly set to "Server authentication," so this validation passes.

Chain of Trust Validation: The client builds a certificate chain from the server’s certificate to a trusted

root CA in its Trusted CA Certificate list. The chain is:

Server certificate (issued by MyCA_Signing)

Intermediate CA certificate (MyCA_Signing, issued by MyCA)

Root CA certificate (MyCA, which should be in the client’s trust store) The client’s Trusted CA

Certificate list does not include MyCA or MyCA_Signing, meaning the client cannot build a chain to a

trusted root CA. This causes the validation to fail.

Option A, "The client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is correct. The client’s trust

store must include the root CA (MyCA) to trust the certificate chain. Since MyCA is not in the client’s

Trusted CA Certificate list, the client cannot validate the chain, and the certificate is not trusted.

Option B, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN," is incorrect. The SAN includes "myhost1.example.com,"

which matches the server’s hostname, so the SAN is valid.

Option C, "The certificate lacks the correct EKU," is incorrect. The EKU is set to "Server

authentication," which is appropriate for HTTPS.

Option D, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN, and the client does not have the correct trusted CA

certificates," is incorrect because the SAN is valid, as explained above. The only issue is the missing

trusted CA certificates.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

"For a client to trust a server’s certificate during HTTPS communication, the client must validate the

certificate chain to a trusted root CA in its trust store. If the root CA (e.g., MyCA) or intermediate CA

(e.g., MyCA_Signing) is not in the client’s Trusted CA Certificate list, the chain of trust cannot be

established, and the client will reject the certificate. The Subject Alternative Name (SAN) must

include the server’s hostname, and the Extended Key Usage (EKU) must include ‘Server

authentication’ for HTTPS." (Page 205, Certificate Validation Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide notes:

"A common reason for certificate validation failure is the absence of the root CA certificate in the

client’s trust store. For example, if a server’s certificate is issued by an intermediate CA (e.g.,

MyCA_Signing) that chains to a root CA (e.g., MyCA), the client must have the root CA certificate in

its Trusted CA Certificate list to trust the chain." (Page 45, Certificate Trust Issues Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, Certificate Validation Section, Page 205.

HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide, Certificate Trust Issues Section, Page 45.

===========

The scenario involves AOS-CX switches in a two-tier topology with Switch-1 as the core switch

(default router) on VLAN 100 and Switch-2 as an access layer switch with VLANs 15 and 25, where

end-user devices connect. The goal is to protect against exploits from untrusted end-user devices,

such as DHCP spoofing or ARP poisoning attacks, which are common threats in access layer networks.

DHCP Snooping: This feature protects against rogue DHCP servers by filtering DHCP messages. It

should be enabled on the access layer switch (Switch-2) where end-user devices connect, specifically

on the VLANs where these devices reside (VLANs 15 and 25). DHCP snooping builds a binding table of

legitimate IP-to-MAC mappings, which can be used by other features like ARP inspection.

ARP Inspection: This feature prevents ARP poisoning attacks by validating ARP packets against the

DHCP snooping binding table. It should also be enabled on the access layer switch (Switch-2) on

VLANs 15 and 25, where untrusted devices are connected.

Option B, "On Switch-2, enable DHCP snooping globally and on VLANs 15 and 25. Later, enable ARP

inspection on the same VLANs," is correct. DHCP snooping must be enabled first to build the binding

table, and then ARP inspection can use this table to validate ARP packets. This configuration should

be applied on Switch-2, the access layer switch, because that’s where untrusted end-user devices

connect.

Option A, "On Switch-1, enable ARP inspection on VLAN 100 and DHCP snooping on VLANs 15 and

25," is incorrect. Switch-1 is the core switch and does not directly connect to end-user devices on

VLANs 15 and 25. DHCP snooping and ARP inspection should be enabled on the access layer switch

(Switch-2) where the devices reside. Additionally, enabling ARP inspection on VLAN 100 (where the

DHCP server is) is unnecessary since the DHCP server is a trusted device.

Option C, "On Switch-2, enable BPDU filtering on all edge ports in order to prevent eavesdropping

attacks by untrusted devices," is incorrect. BPDU filtering is used to prevent spanning tree protocol

(STP) attacks by blocking BPDUs on edge ports, but it does not protect against eavesdropping or

other exploits like DHCP spoofing or ARP poisoning, which are more relevant in this context.

Option D, "On Switch-1, enable DHCP snooping on VLAN 100 and ARP inspection on VLANs 15 and

25," is incorrect for the same reason as Option A. Switch-1 is not the appropriate place to enable

these features since it’s not directly connected to the untrusted devices on VLANs 15 and 25.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

"DHCP snooping should be enabled on access layer switches where untrusted end-user devices

connect. It must be enabled globally and on the specific VLANs where the devices reside (e.g., dhcp-

snooping vlan 15,25). This feature builds a binding table of IP-to-MAC mappings, which can be used

by Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) to prevent ARP poisoning attacks. DAI should also be enabled on

the same VLANs (e.g., ip arp inspection vlan 15,25) after DHCP snooping is configured, ensuring that

ARP packets are validated against the DHCP snooping binding table." (Page 145, DHCP Snooping and

ARP Inspection Section)

Additionally, the guide notes:

"Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) and DHCP snooping are typically configured on access layer switches

to protect against exploits from untrusted devices, such as DHCP spoofing and ARP poisoning. These

features should be applied to the VLANs where end-user devices connect, not on core switches

unless those VLANs are directly connected to untrusted devices." (Page 146, Best Practices Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, DHCP Snooping and ARP Inspection Section,

Page 145.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, Best Practices Section, Page 146.

===========

Aruba ClearPass Device Insight offers a significant benefit by providing highly accurate endpoint

classification. This feature is particularly useful in complex environments with a wide variety of

device types, including IoT devices. Accurate device classification allows network administrators to

better understand the nature and behavior of devices on their network, which is crucial for

implementing appropriate security policies and ensuring network performance and security.

Reference: This feature is highlighted in Aruba ClearPass Device Insight literature and is a major

selling point of the product as it addresses the challenges posed by diverse and growing device

environments in modern networks.