The use case for Transport Layer Security (TLS) is to enable a client and a server to establish secure

communications for another protocol. TLS is a cryptographic protocol designed to provide secure

communication over a computer network. It is widely used for web browsers and other applications

that require data to be securely exchanged over a network, such as file transfers, VPN connections,

and voice-over-IP (VoIP). TLS operates between the transport layer and the application layer of the

Internet Protocol Suite and is used to secure various other protocols like HTTP (resulting in HTTPS),

SMTP, IMAP, and more. This protocol ensures privacy and data integrity between two communicating

applications. Detailed information about TLS and its use cases can be found in IETF RFC 5246, which

outlines the specifications for TLS 1.2, and in subsequent RFCs that define TLS 1.3.

HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses device profiling to identify and classify

endpoints on the network, enabling granular access control based on device type, OS, or other

attributes. CPPM supports both passive and active profiling methods.

Option C, "CPPM can analyze settings such as TTL and time window size in endpoints' TCP traffic in

order to fingerprint the OS," is correct. TCP fingerprinting is a passive profiling method used by

CPPM. It involves analyzing TCP packet headers, such as the Time To Live (TTL) value and TCP window

size, which vary between operating systems (e.g., Windows, Linux, macOS). CPPM captures this

traffic (e.g., via mirrored traffic from a switch or controller) and matches the TCP attributes against its

fingerprint database to identify the OS of the endpoint.

Option A, "CPPM can use Wireshark to actively probe devices, analyze their traffic patterns, and

construct an endpoint profile," is incorrect. CPPM does not use Wireshark for profiling; Wireshark is a

third-party packet analysis tool. CPPM has its own built-in profiling engine and does not rely on

external tools like Wireshark for active probing.

Option B, "CPPM can use SNMP to configure Aruba switches and mobility devices to mirror client

traffic to CPPM for analysis," is incorrect. While CPPM can receive mirrored traffic for profiling (e.g.,

via SPAN or mirror ports), it does not use SNMP to configure the mirroring. The configuration of

traffic mirroring is typically done manually on the switch or controller (e.g., using a datapath mirror

on an MC), not via SNMP by CPPM.

Option D, "CPPM can analyze settings such as TCP/UDP ports used for HTTP, DHCP, and DNS in

endpoints' traffic to fingerprint the OS," is incorrect. While CPPM does analyze HTTP, DHCP, and DNS

traffic for profiling, it does not fingerprint the OS based on TCP/UDP ports. Instead, it uses attributes

like DHCP Option 55 (for DHCP fingerprinting) or HTTP User-Agent strings (for HTTP fingerprinting) to

identify devices, not the ports themselves.

The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:

"ClearPass supports TCP fingerprinting as a passive profiling method to identify the operating system

of endpoints. By analyzing TCP packet headers, such as the Time To Live (TTL) value and TCP window

size, ClearPass can fingerprint the OS of a device. For example, Windows devices typically have a TTL

of 128, while Linux devices often have a TTL of 64. These attributes are matched against ClearPass’s

fingerprint database to classify the device." (Page 248, TCP Fingerprinting Section)

Additionally, the ClearPass Device Insight Data Sheet notes:

"ClearPass uses passive profiling techniques like TCP fingerprinting to identify device operating

systems. By examining TCP attributes such as TTL and window size, ClearPass can accurately

determine whether a device is running Windows, Linux, macOS, or another OS, enabling precise

policy enforcement." (Page 3, Profiling Methods Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide, TCP Fingerprinting Section, Page

248.

ClearPass Device Insight Data Sheet, Profiling Methods Section, Page 3.

===========

ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses various methods to classify endpoints, and one of them is TCP

fingerprinting, which involves analyzing TCP/IP packets to identify the type of device or operating

system sending them. To utilize TCP fingerprinting capabilities, network traffic needs to be accessible

to the CPPM. This can be done by mirroring traffic to CPPM’s span port from a device that can see

the traffic, like a core routing switch. This approach allows CPPM to observe the TCP characteristics of

devices as they communicate over the network, enabling it to make more accurate decisions for

device classification.

This question is identical to

A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack involves an attacker positioning themselves between a wireless

client and the legitimate network to intercept or manipulate traffic. HPE Aruba Networking

documentation often discusses MITM attacks in the context of wireless security threats and

mitigation strategies.

Option D, "The hacker connects a device to the same wireless network as the client and responds to

the client's ARP requests with the hacker device's MAC address," is correct. This describes an ARP

poisoning (or ARP spoofing) attack, a common MITM technique in wireless networks. The hacker

joins the same wireless network as the client (e.g., by authenticating with the same SSID and

credentials). Once on the network, the hacker sends fake ARP responses to the client, associating the

hacker’s MAC address with the IP address of the default gateway (or another target device). This

causes the client to send traffic to the hacker’s device instead of the legitimate gateway, allowing the

hacker to intercept, modify, or forward the traffic, thus performing an MITM attack.

Option A, "The hacker uses a combination of software and hardware to jam the RF band and prevent

the client from connecting to any wireless networks," is incorrect. Jamming the RF band would

disrupt all wireless communication, including the hacker’s ability to intercept traffic. This is a denial-

of-service (DoS) attack, not an MITM attack.

Option B, "The hacker runs an NMap scan on the wireless client to find its MAC and IP address. The

hacker then connects to another network and spoofs those addresses," is incorrect. NMap scans are

used for network discovery and port scanning, not for implementing an MITM attack. Spoofing MAC

and IP addresses on another network does not position the hacker to intercept the client’s traffic on

the original network.

Option C, "The hacker uses spear-phishing to probe for the IP addresses that the client is attempting

to reach. The hacker device then spoofs those IP addresses," is incorrect. Spear-phishing is a delivery

method for malware or credentials theft, not a direct method for implementing an MITM attack.

Spoofing IP addresses alone does not allow the hacker to intercept traffic unless they are on the

same network and can manipulate routing (e.g., via ARP poisoning).

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"A common man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack against wireless clients involves ARP poisoning. The

hacker connects a device to the same wireless network as the client and sends fake ARP responses to

the client, associating the hacker’s MAC address with the IP address of the default gateway. This

causes the client to send traffic to the hacker’s device, allowing the hacker to intercept and

manipulate the traffic." (Page 422, Wireless Threats Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:

"ARP poisoning is a prevalent MITM attack in wireless networks. The attacker joins the same network

as the client and responds to the client’s ARP requests with the attacker’s MAC address, redirecting

traffic through the attacker’s device. This allows the attacker to intercept sensitive data or modify

traffic between the client and the legitimate destination." (Page 72, Wireless MITM Attacks Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Wireless Threats Section, Page 422.

HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide, Wireless MITM Attacks Section, Page 72.

===========

The recommended approach for preventing users in the "user_group1" role from using gaming and

peer-to-peer applications in an ArubaOS environment is to enable Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and

add application rules that specifically deny access to these types of applications for the role. DPI

allows the network system to analyze the content of network traffic in real time and apply policies

based on what it detects, including blocking specific applications like gaming and peer-to-peer

sharing. This capability is essential for effectively managing application usage on the network and

ensuring compliance with organizational policies. Application-specific rules provide precise control

over the network traffic by identifying the application regardless of the network port used, making it

a more effective method than blocking based on ports or IP addresses.

The ArubaOS Security Dashboard, part of the AOS-8 architecture (Mobility Controllers or Mobility

Master), provides visibility into wireless clients and access points (APs) through its Wireless Intrusion

Prevention (WIP) system. The goal is to identify clients that belong to the company (i.e., authorized

clients) and have connected to devices that might belong to hackers (i.e., rogue APs).

Client Classification:

Authorized: A client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP and is recognized as part

of the company’s network (e.g., an employee device).

Interfering: A client that is not authenticated to the company’s network and is considered external or

potentially malicious.

AP Classification:

Authorized: An AP that is part of the company’s network and managed by the MC/MM.

Rogue: An AP that is not authorized and is suspected of being malicious (e.g., connected to the

company’s wired network without permission).

Neighbor: An AP that is not part of the company’s network but is not connected to the wired

network (e.g., a nearby AP from another organization).

The requirement is to find a client that is authorized (belongs to the company) and connected to a

rogue AP (might belong to hackers).

Option A: MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:70:ab; Client Classification: Interfering; AP Classification: Rogue

This client is classified as "Interfering," meaning it does not belong to the company. Although it is

connected to a rogue AP, it does not meet the requirement of being a company client.

Option B: MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:6e:c5; Client Classification: Interfering; AP Classification:

Neighbor

This client is "Interfering" (not a company client) and connected to a "Neighbor" AP, which is not

considered a hacker’s device (it’s just a nearby AP).

Option C: MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:6e:60; Client Classification: Interfering; AP Classification:

Authorized

This client is "Interfering" (not a company client) and connected to an "Authorized" AP, which is part

of the company’s network, not a hacker’s device.

Option D: MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:6d:a4; Client Classification: Authorized; AP Classification: Rogue

This client is "Authorized," meaning it belongs to the company, and it is connected to a "Rogue" AP,

which might belong to hackers. This matches the requirement perfectly.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"The Security Dashboard in ArubaOS provides a client list that includes the client classification and

the AP classification for each client. A client classified as ‘Authorized’ has successfully authenticated

to an authorized AP and is part of the company’s network. A ‘Rogue’ AP is an unauthorized AP that is

suspected of being malicious, often because it is connected to the company’s wired network (e.g.,

detected via Eth-Wired-Mac-Table match). To identify potential security risks, look for authorized

clients connected to rogue APs, as this may indicate that a company device has connected to a

hacker’s AP." (Page 415, Security Dashboard Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:

"An ‘Authorized’ client is one that has authenticated to an AP managed by the controller, typically an

employee or corporate device. A ‘Rogue’ AP is classified as such if it is not authorized and poses a

potential threat, such as being connected to the corporate LAN. Identifying authorized clients

connected to rogue APs is critical for detecting potential man-in-the-middle attacks." (Page 78, WIP

Classifications Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Security Dashboard Section, Page 415.

HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide, WIP Classifications Section, Page 78.

===========

The scenario involves an AOS-CX switch configured for 802.1X port-access authentication. The

configuration defines several roles and their associated VLANs:

port-access role role1 vlan access 11: Role1 assigns VLAN 11.

port-access role role2 vlan access 12: Role2 assigns VLAN 12.

port-access role role3 vlan access 13: Role3 assigns VLAN 13.

port-access role role4 vlan access 14: Role4 assigns VLAN 14.

The switch has 802.1X authentication enabled globally (aaa authentication port-access dot1x

authenticator enable). Two ports are configured:

Interface 1/1/1:

vlan access 1: Default VLAN is 1.

aaa authentication port-access critical-role role1: If the RADIUS server is unavailable, assign role1

(VLAN 11).

aaa authentication port-access preauth-role role2: Before authentication, assign role2 (VLAN 12).

aaa authentication port-access auth-role role3: After successful authentication, assign role3 (VLAN

13) unless overridden by a VSA.

Interface 1/1/2: Same configuration as 1/1/1.

Client1 on port 1/1/1:

Client1 authenticates successfully, and CPPM sends an Access-Accept with the VSA Aruba-User-Role:

role4.

In AOS-CX, the auth-role (role3) is applied after successful authentication unless the RADIUS server

specifies a different role via the Aruba-User-Role VSA. Since CPPM sends Aruba-User-Role: role4, and

role4 exists on the switch, Client1 is assigned role4 (VLAN 14), overriding the default auth-role

(role3).

Client2 on port 1/1/2:

Client2 does not attempt to authenticate (i.e., does not send 802.1X credentials).

In AOS-CX, if a client does not attempt authentication and no other authentication method (e.g.,

MAC authentication) is configured, the client is placed in the preauth-role (role2, VLAN 12). This role

is applied before authentication or when authentication is not attempted, allowing the client limited

access (e.g., to perform authentication or access a captive portal).

Option A, "Client1 = role3; Client2 = role2," is incorrect because Client1 should be assigned role4

(from the VSA), not role3.

Option B, "Client1 = role4; Client2 = role1," is incorrect because Client2 should be assigned the

preauth-role (role2), not the critical-role (role1), since the RADIUS server is reachable (Client1

authenticated successfully).

Option C, "Client1 = role4; Client2 = role2," is correct. Client1 gets role4 from the VSA, and Client2

gets the preauth-role (role2) since it does not attempt authentication.

Option D, "Client1 = role3; Client2 = role1," is incorrect for the same reasons as Option A and Option

B.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

"After successful 802.1X authentication, the AOS-CX switch assigns the client to the auth-role

configured for the port (e.g., aaa authentication port-access auth-role role3). However, if the RADIUS

server returns an Aruba-User-Role VSA (e.g., Aruba-User-Role: role4), and the specified role exists on

the switch, the client is assigned that role instead of the auth-role. If a client does not attempt

authentication and no other authentication method is configured, the client is assigned the preauth-

role (e.g., aaa authentication port-access preauth-role role2), which provides limited access before

authentication." (Page 132, 802.1X Authentication Section)

Additionally, the guide notes:

"The critical-role (e.g., aaa authentication port-access critical-role role1) is applied only when the

RADIUS server is unavailable. The preauth-role is applied when a client connects but does not

attempt 802.1X authentication." (Page 134, Port-Access Roles Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, 802.1X Authentication Section, Page 132.

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, Port-Access Roles Section, Page 134.

===========

HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses device profiling to classify endpoints,

and one of its profiling methods involves analyzing HTTP User-Agent strings to identify device types

(e.g., iPhone, Windows laptop). HTTP User-Agent strings are sent in HTTP headers when a client

accesses a website. For CPPM to profile devices using HTTP User-Agent strings, it must receive the

HTTP traffic from the clients. In this scenario, the company is using Mobility Controllers (MCs),

campus APs, and AOS-CX switches, and CPPM is the only ClearPass solution in use.

HTTP User-Agent Profiling: CPPM can passively profile devices by analyzing HTTP traffic, but it needs

to receive this traffic. In an AOS-8 architecture, the MC can mirror client traffic to CPPM for profiling.

Since HTTP traffic is part of the data plane (user traffic), the MC must mirror the data plane traffic

(not control plane traffic) to CPPM.

Option A, "Create datapath mirrors that use the CPPM's IP address as the destination," is correct. The

MC can be configured to mirror client HTTP traffic to CPPM using a datapath mirror (also known as a

GRE mirror). This involves setting up a mirror session on the MC that sends a copy of the client’s

HTTP traffic to CPPM’s IP address. CPPM then analyzes the HTTP User-Agent strings in this traffic to

profile the endpoints. For example, the command mirror session 1 destination ip source

ip any protocol http can be used to mirror HTTP traffic to CPPM.

Option B, "Create an IF-MAP profile, which specifies credentials for an API admin account on CPPM,"

is incorrect. IF-MAP (Interface for Metadata Access Points) is a protocol used for sharing profiling

data between ClearPass and other systems (e.g., Aruba Introspect), but it is not used for sending

HTTP traffic to CPPM for profiling. Additionally, IF-MAP is not relevant when only CPPM is in use.

Option C, "Create control path mirrors to mirror HTTP traffic from clients to CPPM," is incorrect.

Control path (control plane) traffic includes management traffic between the MC and APs (e.g., AP

registration, heartbeats), not client HTTP traffic. HTTP traffic is part of the data plane, so a datapath

mirror is required, not a control path mirror.

Option D, "Create a firewall whitelist rule that permits HTTP and CPPM's IP address," is incorrect. A

firewall whitelist rule on the MC might be needed to allow traffic to CPPM, but this is not the primary

step for enabling HTTP User-Agent profiling. The key requirement is to mirror the HTTP traffic to

CPPM, which is done via a datapath mirror, not a firewall rule.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"To enable ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) to profile devices using HTTP User-Agent strings, the

Mobility Controller (MC) must mirror client HTTP traffic to CPPM. This is done by creating a datapath

mirror session that sends a copy of the client’s HTTP traffic to CPPM’s IP address. For example, use

the command mirror session 1 destination ip source ip any protocol http to mirror HTTP

traffic to CPPM. CPPM then analyzes the HTTP User-Agent strings to classify endpoints by type (e.g.,

iPhone, Windows laptop)." (Page 350, Device Profiling with CPPM Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide notes:

"HTTP User-Agent profiling requires ClearPass to receive HTTP traffic from clients. In an Aruba

Mobility Controller environment, configure a datapath mirror to send HTTP traffic to ClearPass’s IP

address. ClearPass will parse the HTTP User-Agent strings to identify device types and operating

systems, enabling accurate profiling." (Page 249, HTTP User-Agent Profiling Section)

:

HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Device Profiling with CPPM Section, Page 350.

HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide, HTTP User-Agent Profiling

Section, Page 249.

===========

RadSec (RADIUS over TLS) is a protocol for transporting RADIUS messages over TLS-encrypted TCP/IP

networks. The primary use case for implementing RadSec instead of traditional RADIUS is to protect

RADIUS communications, particularly when those messages must travel across an untrusted

network, such as the internet. RadSec provides confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for

RADIUS traffic between clients and servers which may not be within a single secure network. In the

case of a school district that wants to ensure the security of messages sent between RADIUS clients

and servers over potentially insecure networks, RadSec would be the appropriate choice.