Option B makes sense. Setting security and quality checks in the CI/CD pipeline is how you can automate hashing, version control, and vulnerability scanning before any containers go live. The other choices don't guarantee these checks happen upfront. Pretty sure this is what they're after but let me know if anyone sees it differently.
Man, another classic CompTIA SIEM question. C imo, since only a SIEM can really guarantee proper, compliant retention across old and new systems like the audit wants. Scripts and tasks are just workarounds. Disagree?
I don’t think it’s C. Protecting from identity theft sounds good but doesn’t cover portability, which HIPAA actually cares about. D fits better for both privacy and operational needs unless I'm missing something in the question wording?
D makes the most sense to me for reducing privilege escalation. By isolating the container in a separate network and putting ACLs on the load balancer, external access is tightly controlled so attackers can't easily escalate out or reach other segments. Not 100% sure since I could see an argument for A, but D feels like the right approach here. Agree?
Pretty sure it's A. Disabling DNS zone transfers actually prevents AXFR, which is how attackers map out the internal environment. D tempts you but it doesn't stop zone transfers from authorized but compromised clients. If I'm missing something let me know.
Wouldn't the hashes of vetted packages mainly help with identifying compromised or malicious dependencies? That seems like supply chain to me, since on-path (D) is more about interception during transit, not package integrity. Am I missing a scenario where another option would fit?